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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Sanctions Controversy
Sanctions are a controversial policy tool that governments use in response to
instances of international law-breaking. There have been objections to sanctions made by
scholars and policy makers, citing their inability to be successful. There are many
reasons scholars and policy makers give for not supporting the use of sanctions but
governments also need a response tool to foreign outrages that is between diplomacy and
military force, leaving sanctions to be the only viable option (Schott 1998). The
maintenance of peace in the international community is of the utmost importance to
States as revealed by the Charter to the United Nations (UN). States’ arsenal of policy
tools need to contain a strong and clear sanctions policy in order to achieve in a change in
behavior in the law-breaking State while avoiding the use of force. This study contends
that sanctions are the best option for achieving a change in behavior in a law-breaking
State if States collectively decide to impose sanctions.
There are some basic definitions that are necessary to put forth in order to have a
complete understanding of the discussion on sanctions. A sanctions episode is a single
instance of sanctions being imposed on a target state by the sender state(s). A sender in a
sanctions episode is the state that is the principal author of the sanctions. A target in a
sanctions episode is the State that is the immediate recipient of sanctions1.
Although this study affirms the success that sanctions can achieve, there are those
in academia that doubt the success of sanctions. Some argue that because electronic

1

These terms are used throughout all of the research on sanctions and I have adopted them for the purposes
of this study.
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money transfers can be made so quickly, financial sanctions, more specifically, asset
freezes are pointless (Cortwright & Lopez 2002). The truth is that advances in
technology have produced interdiction software that makes it much easier to prevent
States from making illicit transfers once they realize sanctions are on the horizon
(Cortwright & Lopez 2002). The advances in interdiction software also solve the
problem of multiple banks being involved in the transfer processes (Cortwright & Lopez
2002).
Another commonly raised objection to sanctions is that when States are
attempting to freeze the assets of a target, the accounts are not in the name of the specific
person being targeted. This problem is why the sender of the sanctions needs to cast a
wide net; intelligence gathering is essential in order to insure that the correct accounts of
the targeted individuals that are in charge of the State are found (Cortwright & Lopez
2002). Scholars, as well as policy makers, also argue that trade embargoes take a while
to be effective, giving State elites time to hide their assets. The ability of States elites to
hide their assets is precisely why sanctions, once decided upon, need to be implemented
swiftly, leaving little time for the hiding of assets (Cortwright & Lopez 2002).
Sanctions are also criticized as being unsuccessful because the United States and
UN Security Council have taken a disproportionate responsibility of international security
and, therefore, over use sanctions, leading many to conclude they are ineffective (“India
and World Peace” 1998). According to Michael Barkun (1968), a major problem with
sanctions is that the “police” function has been placed upon the United States and the
Security Council and both have fallen short of that task. Barkun (1968) suggests that this
problem can be corrected if the United States and Security Council enforce international
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rules and norms with greater regularity and with greater support from the international
community. Barkun (1968) cites sanction episodes with India, Pakistan, Iran, and North
Korea to suggest that sanctions would have been successful if rules and norms had been
upheld and there had been a commitment to enforcement (Barkun 1968).
The UN also falls short because sanctions are not applicable in every breach of
international law, leaving States shouldering the responsibility of enforcing the law, and
deciding which instances to punish and which to ignore (Farrall 2007). The only body
within the UN that has the ability to impose sanctions is the Security Council. Given that
five Member States, the P-5, have the ability to veto any vote on sanctions, the Security
Council, and UN as a whole, is not always the most effective avenue for implementing
sanctions (Farrall 2007).
Richard Haass and Meghan O’Sullivan (2000) point out some risks of adopting an
engagement policy that includes sanctions: (1) a problem State, by its very nature, may be
beyond the influence of another State; (2) the type of influence that groups with
economic interests and other actors exert on the foreign policy of the sender State may
muddy the waters so-to-speak; (3) the process for making judgments when formulating a
policy to respond to the conduct of a problem state is not clear, there needs to be clear
guidelines; (4) there is a need for reliable intelligence assets and capabilities when
implementing an engagement policy; (5) when dealing with authoritarian regimes, the
sender needs to provide the initiative to the target State to decide whether or not to
comply or resist engagement; and there is no road map for an engagement policy.
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Haass and O’Sullivan (2000) point out that the senders need to carefully evaluate
their engagement policies regularly. Haass and O’Sullivan (2000) also point out areas of
consensus concerning the subject of sanctions. They maintain that sanctions almost
always result in economic hardship and are often insufficient or unable to force the
desired change. Sanctions can be costly for innocent bystanders who are usually the
poorest people in the target State and for businessman and commercial interests in the
sender and target States. Sanctions also evoke unintended consequences, like the
strengthening of an obnoxious regime, as was the case with the North Korea (Haass &
O’Sullivan 2000).
States have the ability to implement sanctions on their own, and it is the purpose
of this study to suggest that sanctions episodes do have the ability to change States’
behavior when sanctions are implemented collectively. States do not have to wait for the
Security Council to impose sanctions. If States, most importantly the major powers, act
swiftly, collectively, and with a strong commitment to sanctions they have the ability to
change States’ behavior and prevent the conflict from spreading outside the target State.
The commitment to sanctions is often the most important of these necessities because
successful sanctions take time to reach fruition. Sanctions episodes against South Africa
and Libya were each successful episodes, however, they took decades to reach a point
where there was a change in behavior on the part of the target regime. Sanctions do not
work overnight because changing the behavior of a State, which is run by humans, is a
difficult task that requires a strong commitment and endurance. Human behavior is
extremely difficult to change.
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Sanctions
Economic and financial sanctions are a widely studied controversial phenomenon
in the field of International Relations. There is a definite division between scholars over
the efficacy of sanctions which has already been discussed. Among those who support
the idea that sanctions are a vital engagement tool in foreign policy, there is agreement
that sanctions are effective in 35 percent of the sanctions episodes that have occurred
since the founding of the UN (Hufbauer et al. 2008; Drezner 1999). Although 35 percent
success in most studies is considered a low outcome, in this study it is a reasonably
decent success rate, sanctions are, after all, charged with changing States’ behavior.
This study will focus on why sanctions were successful in South Africa and Libya
and not in India and Pakistan. This chapter will discuss the history of sanctions in terms
of how they have been utilized by States as far back as ancient Greece. The discussion
will then turn to how sanctions have been utilized and imposed by both the League of
Nations and the UN. The discussion of sanctions rests firmly on the belief that sanctions
work best as a form on containment if they are implemented by a collection of States.
Therefore, both containment and collective security will also be explained in this chapter.
UN sanctions against Iraq are one of the best examples of how collective sanctions were
able to contain and secure an entire region. The final section will discuss methodology
and reasons for choosing to focus this study on South Africa, Libya, Pakistan, and India.
Sanctions are considered a form of coercive diplomacy by the international
community. Coercive diplomacy is a defensive strategy that utilizes the threat of force
rather than the actual use of force.
The general intent of coercive diplomacy is to back a demand on an adversary with a
threat of punishment for noncompliance that will be credible and potent enough to
12

persuade him that it is in his interest to comply with the demand (George & Simmons, 2,
1994).

Sanctions are most often used as a defensive strategy that can be used to persuade a target
to stop or reverse some law-breaking action (George & Simmons 1994). Sanctions are
always in response to a strategy already undertaken by the law-breaking state. Therefore,
it is the assertion of this study that sanctions are the best option for containment and
security because they are a strong alternative to military strategies. However, there are
limits to coercive diplomacy. According to rational choice theory2, this strategy of
utilizing sanctions as a means of coercive diplomacy rests on the assumption that the
target of sanctions is a rational actor that will weigh the costs and benefits of compliance
(George & Simmons 1994; Guzman 2008).
Sanctions are generally designed to achieve one of two goals: (1) there are those
designed to change a policy in the target state and (2) those which are designed to
destabilize the target State (Dashti-Gibson et al. 1997). They are typically imposed
through economic or financial means. Sanctions cause the most harm when they disrupt
trade and the flow of foreign currency in the target State creating harsh economic
conditions within their state. Those sanctions that interrupt trade often affect normal
citizens the most while those that disrupt the flow of foreign currency affect leaders and
elite members of society; those that affect the leaders and elite members of society are
often times the most successful form of sanctions (Dashti-Gibson et al. 1997).
Globalization has made the use of economic sanctions a more attractive policy
tool because of the interconnectedness of financial markets, making it easier to isolate a
2

For further information on rational choice theory see:
Guzman, Andrew T. How International Law Works: A Rational Choice Theory. New York: Oxford
University Press, 2008.
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target economy (Davis & Engerman 2003). Economic sanctions are typically a tool
utilized by wealthy States due to the fact that the sender’s economy can withstand the
costs of sanctions (Davis & Engerman 2003). There are also diplomatic sanctions,
which do not carry the same weight as economic or financial sanctions. Diplomatic
sanctions allow one state to protest against another through speeches given by diplomats
and ambassadors. The success of diplomatic sanctions depends heavily on the
importance of the protesting state and should be implemented by a collection of States
(Royal Institute 1938). Diplomatic sanctions are rarely successful if they are not paired
with economic and financial sanctions and there is only one protesting state due to their
largely symbolic nature (Royal Institute 1938). The idea here is that diplomatic
negotiations need to be paired with harsher sanctions in order to cause the most hardship
in the target State.
One of the main reasons for imposing sanctions is to uphold international law.
International law is derived from many sources, such as treaties, accords, precedents from
international courts and tribunals and agreements signed by States. International norms
are also upheld as forms of international law. The main goal of international law is to
regulate the behavior of States to create order (Cassese 2005; Guzman 2008). The UN
and international courts and tribunals are the main international bodies charged with
upholding international law. However, given the problems of enforcement within these
bodies, there is largely a lack of central authority. Member States of the UN are
obligated to uphold international law as one of the tenets of their membership to the UN
(Cassese 2005). The international community is largely anarchical; however, States
function in good faith, meaning they trust that all States are upholding international law.
14

There is a collective responsibility among States to punish any breach of international
law. Most States have incorporated international rules and norms into their own national
legislation, providing a more concrete means of punishment for any infraction of
international law, especially when committed by individuals (Cassese 2005; Guzman
2008). Sanctions have therefore become a means of punishment for international lawbreaking rather than resorting to the use of States’ military power.
States interested in the preservation of peace typically use sanctions more often in
order to avoid militarized action or use of force (Royal Institute 1938). The prevention of
armed conflict is of the utmost importance in the international community, making
sanctions a more and more widely used tool by many States, especially the major powers.
The sending state imposes sanctions to secure a policy change in the target state because
some international norm or law is not being upheld. This policy change happens in one
of two ways in most cases: (1) sanctions destabilize the current leader and a more pliable
leader comes to power or (2) the sending state is able to reach a compromise with the
leader of the target state by offering to lift sanctions if some policy is changed. This
compromise often means the sending state has to revise its initial expectations; however,
this is an example of diplomacy at work (Marinov 2005).
Containment
“Good relations with great powers, like those with small ones, require constant attention and
nurturing not only in crises but at all times.”3

It is important to first note that containment is not a military term. Containment is
not a response to a military threat, but rather a response to a political or ideological threat
3

Kennan, George F. “The Shape of American Foreign Policy in the Post-Cold War Era: A Perspective
Honed in the Twentieth Century.” American Foreign Policy Interests, 27: 167-169, 2005.
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(Kennan 2005). It is an effort to stop the spread of instability in a region and to stop the
spread of unlawful policies by a state. The Cold War is an example of containment.
During World War II the United States made concessions to the Soviet Union which
allowed them to overrun most of Eastern Europe and West Germany. These concessions
were necessary in order to win the war (Kennan1987). However, once the war was won
by the allies, containing the spread of Communism meant that the United States could
make no further concessions to the Soviets (Kennan 1987).
Sanctions are the best means of containing a conflict, or potential conflict and
punishing law-breaking States without resorting to militarized action. As Kennan (2005)
points out, just because a state may have policies that are contradictory to the tenets of
democracy and its ideals does not mean that state is out to destroy democratic societies.
Rather than resorting to the use of force, sanctions can be a more effective first course of
action once initial diplomatic negotiations have failed. The spread of democracy to all
States in the world, which is the goal of many democratic States, will not be achieved in
our lifetimes, if ever, and it is therefore the responsibility of leaders today to contain
conflict areas and uphold international law in an effort to prevent the spread on instability
into other regions (Kennan 2005).
If the UN or the United States and its allies wish to change the behavior of defiant
States, sending States, must have intelligent, long-range policies that are just as
resourceful and varied as those of the targets being punished. In order to achieve this
change in behavior, sanctions should be included in the package of policies implemented
to change a target’s behavior. The sender States of sanctions, which are usually
democratic States, need to be consistent in their policies towards the target (Kennan
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1947). Kennan (1947) notes that vigilant containment of the expansion of a target’s
policies has nothing to do with threats and everything to do with consistent policies that
take action. A loss of control by the sender signals weakness to the target.
Dictatorships are most often the targets of sanctions by democratic States and
most of the time these dictatorships have weak economies and citizens that are already
suffering as a result (Kennan 1947). This fact alone makes sanctions one of, if not the
best options by States wishing to change the behavior of that target. While a change of
behavior takes time, containment can be achieved in the interim. Containment is
achieved through an unwavering counterforce for each and every sign of encroachment
upon peace and stability, making the target’s reputation look as bad as possible while
making the sender’s reputation sparkle, and creating a strained domestic situation for the
target making it difficult for the regimes to carry out its daily activities (Kennan 1947).
A change in behavior may then follow, but at the very least, the imposition of sanctions
will prevent the spread of instability to neighboring regions.
The same can be said of Iraq once the 1991 Gulf War was over. Sanctions against
Iraq had managed to contain the regime. Saddam Hussein was not invading any
neighboring States or using weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) against them.
Sanctions were working in Iraq. The regime had changed its behavior because it was not
bullying its neighbors and was contained within its own borders until the use of force was
once again brought into the equation. The situation quickly deteriorated in Iraq and has
caused instability in the region that has spread into neighboring States. Sanctions
provided containment in Iraq, the second war in Iraq has caused instability. There are
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now many situations in the world in need of containment and this study maintains that
sanctions are the most effective way to achieve it.
The weapons race is not all there is in this imperfect world that needs to be contained.
There are many other sources of instability and trouble. There are local danger spots
scattered about in the Third World. There is the dreadful situation in southern Africa.
There is the grim phenomenon of a rise in several parts of the world of a fanatical and
wildly destructive religious fundamentalism, and there is the terrorism to which that sort
of fundamentalism so often resorts. There is the worldwide environmental crisis, the
rapid depletion of the world’s nonrenewable energy resources, the steady pollution of its
atmosphere and its waters – the general deterioration of its environment as a support
system for civilized living (Kennan 1987).

Kennan (1987) foresaw the conflict situations we would be dealing with in
modern times and supported containment as a means for controlling these situations. The
situation in southern African was resolved through the use of sanctions. The world is
now dealing with the religious fundamentalism, mainly in the Middle East, he referred to
and the terrorism used by these zealots. States are trying to discover the best way to deal
with this situation, and this study suggests using Libya as a model. Although sanctions
against Libya lasted over thirty years, they ended in success. Libya is contained and no
longer a supporter of state-sponsored terrorism, as best as the international community
can tell4. Sanctions are a proven form of containment and the best option for avoiding
the use of force, however, in order for sanctions to contain a conflict area they must be in
the form of multilateral sanctions.
History of Sanctions
Ancient Greece and United States Colonization
Sanctions have been utilized as a means of coercive diplomacy since 432 B.C. in
ancient Greece when Pericles issued the Megarian Decree in an effort to limit access to

4

Refer to chapter 3
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Megara’s products; this was then known as a siege. Sieges are one of the earliest forms
of economic sanctions and function by starving the target into submission. The Megarian
Decree is the first documented example of peacetime economic sanctions in history. The
imposition of these sanctions in the Megarian Decree eventually led to the Peloponnesian
War. Given this fact one could challenge the success of these sanctions. However, the
most important point here is that sanctions have been utilized since ancient Greece. This
example of the Megarian Decree mirrors the events that took place in the United States
during colonization.
The United States colonies imposed trade sanctions against Great Britain as a way
of prosecuting war (Askari et al. 2003). Ideally sanctions preclude military action but as
Askari et al. (2003) note, the American imposition of sanctions against Great Britain is an
example of sanctions that would have been successful had the colonists had not also been
fighting for independence. These two sanctions episodes highlight the fact that sanctions
were still a fairly new phenomenon that had not yet been institutionalized; States did not
know the rules of the game. States at the time did not know what to do after the sanctions
were implemented and enforced. Sanctions were not followed by intense negotiation and
diplomacy. Today States utilize their diplomats in order to negotiate the lifting of
sanctions, whether that means offering concessions, inducements, or because demands
have been met.
League of ations Sanctions
The League of Nations was founded in 1920 in response to World War I in an
effort to maintain international peace and security and uphold international law. The
League was based on four main principles: (1) ‘the acceptance of the obligation not to
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resort to war’, (2) ‘the prescription of open, just, and honorable relations between
nations’, (3) ‘the firm establishment of the understanding of international law as the
actual rule of conduct among governments’, and (4) ‘the maintenance of justice and a
scrupulous respect for all treaty obligations in the dealing of organized people with one
another’ (Royal Institute of International Affairs, 3, 1938). The League was the
international organization responsible for ensuring that these principles were upheld. Its
main instrument of coercion was the implementation of sanctions that had now been
institutionalized (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1938).
In 1935 the definition of sanctions, as defined by the Royal Institute of
International Affairs, was the specific penalty enacted in order to secure obedience to a
law. According to the Royal Institute (1938) sanctions were originally thought of as a
punishment or deterrent for starting a war which is technically a breach of international
law. The League turned to sanctions as a means of coercion, rather than resorting to the
use of force on 18 November 1935 when sanctions were multilaterally (50 States against
one) imposed against Italy. In October 1935 Italy invaded Ethiopia to gain control of the
area known as the WalWal because the Italian dictator Mussolini wanted power in East
Africa (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1938). The League reacted by imposing
sanctions against Italy citing Article XVI of the League Covenant that States all Member
States will cut off trade and personal relationships with covenant-breaking States if
sanctions are imposed, nationals of either state are to have no contact.
The success of the sanctions against Italy is debatable (Askari et al. 2003). Some
argue that since the sanctions were only partially imposed it is not fair to say they failed
while others argue that because they were not successful they should not be used. Either
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way, the League of Nations imposed or threatened to impose sanctions eight times during
its short existence (see Table 1) (Askari et al. 2003). The sanctions episodes involving
Yugoslavia, Turkey, and Bulgaria are the only episodes out of the initial eight that that
are considered to be successful. This demonstrates that sanctions do have the potential
for success considering that within the League of Nations alone there was a 37.5 percent
success rate (Askari et al. 2003). Again, 37.5 percent is a high success rate when you
consider the difficulty and likelihood of actually changing State behavior.
Table 1
League of !ations Sanctions Episodes, Including Threats of Sanctions and Meetings to Consider
Sanctions*
Target
Outcome
Threat of sanctions against Yugoslavia

Yugoslavia withdrew from Albania

Threat of sanctions against Greece

Greece withdrew from Bulgaria

League met to punish Japan

Nothing came of that meeting

Arms embargo against Paraguay over skirmish
with Bolivia
Weak sanctions imposed against Italy for
invading Ethiopia
Sanctions developed during Spanish Civil War

Both parties reached a peaceful settlement

Sanctions imposed against Bulgaria for illegal
drug trafficking
Sanctions against Turkey for illegal drug
trafficking

Successful resolution

Sanctions were only partially imposed
Sanctions were never adopted

Successful resolution

Note: Information provided in Askari, Hossein, John Forrer, Hildy Teegan and Jiawen Yang. Economic
Sanctions: Examining their Policy and Efficacy. Westport, CT: Greenwood Publishing Group, Inc., 2003.
*This is a list of the major sanctions episodes in the League of Nations.

United ations Sanctions
The UN was founded in 1945 after the dissolution of the League of Nations
following World War II. The main purpose of the UN is to maintain peace and save
proceeding generations from the ‘scourge of war.’ Article 41 of the UN Charter
21

provides for sanctions and States that “the Security Council may decide what measures
not involving the use of armed force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions,
and it may call upon the Members of the United Nations to apply such measures. These
may include complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air,
postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the severance of
diplomatic relations (Chapter 7, Article 41 of UN Charter).”
Sanctions have been a way for the UN to maintain peace and security in the 20th
century. UN sanctions are defined as actions that aim to place physical restrictions upon
the ability of a target to engage in the use of force itself, or to depict action which seeks
to restrict the target’s freedom in other respects, such as in relations of an economic,
financial, diplomatic or representative, sporting or cultural nature; sanctions are
commonly used to coerce or punish; UN sanctions are binding, mandatory measures short
of the use of force that are applied against particular States or Non-state actors by the UN
Security Council (Chapter 7, Article 41 of UN Charter).
Farrall (2007) identifies nine types of sanctions, both economic and noneconomic, generally utilized by the UN: (1) comprehensive economic sanctions; (2)
particular economic sanctions; (3) financial sanctions; (4) diplomatic and representative
sanctions; (5) transportation sanctions; (6) travel sanctions; (7) aviation sanctions; (8)
sporting, cultural, scientific sanctions; and, (9) telecommunication sanctions. The UN
Security Council is the main sender of sanctions within the UN and has increased its use
of sanctions in the Post-Cold War world. Farrall (2007) argues that sanctions have been a
prominent feature in International Relations because sanctions are the least unpleasant of
all the coercive alternatives such as military force. UN sanctions in the 20th century have
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had a one in three success rate (Hufbauer et al. 2003). Prior to the 1990s the Security
Council had only imposed mandatory economic sanctions twice. Financial sanctions
have been the most widely imposed type of sanctions by the Security Council having
been imposed in 153 of 204 sanctions episodes. UN sanctions seek to uphold
international law and the 35 percent success rate of Security Council sanctions provide
evidence that sanctions are successful (Farrall 2007; Hufbauer et al. 2008).
Collective Security
In primitive societies groups played a much larger role than individuals and it was
the responsibility of the group to offer punishment to any transgressors, the same can be
said of the international community today (Cassese 2005). It is the responsibility of
States to hold deviant States accountable for any law-breaking behavior according to
Article 41 of the UN Charter. The idea of collective responsibility has trickled down
throughout history which is why organizations such as the UN exist today. Collective
responsibility means that not only is the entire international community responsible for
punishing law-breaking States but the entire international community may suffer the
consequences of that law-breaking behavior by the deviant state (Cassese 2005). The UN
was founded on the idea of collective responsibility and all Member States agreed to the
responsibility of maintaining peace and security when they signed the UN charter. The
UN charter also obligates States to solve disputes peacefully, rather than resort to the use
of force which is why collective sanctions are the best means of containing and
potentially changing deviant behavior (Cassese 2005).
It has been stated throughout the literature on sanctions that the best results are
obtained when sanctions are collectively imposed by major powers (Hufbauer et al. 2008;

23

Askari et al. 2003; Clark1932; Hass & O’Sullivan 2000; Rodman 2001; Wolf 1980;
Drezner 1999; Cassese 2005; Guzman 2008; Doxey 1999). This is the case because
multilateral/collective sanctions send a much stronger message to the target and the
global community while imposing much harsher penalties upon the target for
noncompliance. “Every organized society is founded upon the principle that the
enforcement of law is a function which belongs to the whole community and not to each
interested member,” as is the case in the international community (Clark, 88, 1932). It is
the responsibility of law-abiding States to uphold international law to make law-breaking
States accountable for their misdeeds, if not, the international community experiences
more anarchy than is already in place. Iraq is the best example of collective action being
taken by the international community through the use of sanctions in an effort the secure
the region. Security Council sanctions against Iraq in 1991 are evidence that collective
sanctions, do, in fact, constitute a form of collective security. Iraq suffered damages as a
result of sanctions that brought its GNP to half of what it was pre-Gulf War (Drezner
1999). Sanctions contained the region, making it safer for all neighboring States in the
region.
Sanctions are best addressed as a means of collective security because they can
illicit the cooperation of Multi-National Corporations (MNCs) as well as international
organizations. Coalitions of Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) can pressure
MNCs to comply with sanctions, even if their home governments do not. NGOs and
other international organizations act as a moral authority when exerting such pressure on
MNCs (Rodman 2001). Pressure from NGOs and public opinion can lead municipalities
to pass laws that discourage corporations from conducting business in law-breaking
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States. This was the case when local municipalities within the US threatened to stop
selling Pepsi products on college campuses in order to discourage PepsiCo from
conducting business in Burma (Rodman 2001). This act was successful and PepsiCo
divested from Burma. If ordinances cause more damage to the MNC than staying in the
disputed area, cooperation is likely. The actions taken by PepsiCo and local
municipalities are an example of collective action at all levels of the international
community (Rodman 2001; Hufbauer, et al. 2008).
There are, of course, problems that occur when States and international
organizations attempt to enforce collective sanctions. One of these issues that arise is the
free-rider problem. States have the potential of incurring high costs when imposing
sanctions. These high costs provide an incentive for States to wait for another to impose
the sanctions in order to avoid incurring those high costs (Guzman 2005). However,
reputations of States play a large role in their international dealings so this provides an
incentive for States to collectively impose sanctions in order to maintain a good
reputation. The solution to these problems is collective enforcement. When States
collectively enforce sanctions, they share the burden and the costs of implementation
(Rodman 2001).
Methodology
In order to support the argument that collective sanctions are the best means of
changing a States’ behavior without resorting to force, this study will utilize case studies
of the sanctions imposed against South Africa, Libya, India, and Pakistan. Sanctions
cases against South African and Libya will be analyzed in order to support the argument
that collective sanctions do indeed contain law-breaking behavior, preventing the spread
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of instability as well as leading to an eventual change in behavior. South Africa and
Libya have been chosen because these are two sanctions episodes scholars widely agree
were successful (Segal 1964, Nesbitt 2004, Doxey 1980, Farrall 2007, Rodman 2001,
Eyler 2007, Ramphal 1990, Haass & O’Sullivan 2000, Cortwright & Lopez 2002, Bowen
2006, Rose 1998, Askari et al. 2003). Economic data will be offered to support the
argument that collective sanctions did indeed work in both South Africa and Libya. The
sanctions episodes against India and Pakistan will illustrate how, if sanctions had been
applied differently, the outcomes could have been different. Pakistan now has the fastest
growing nuclear arsenal in the world and the instability from Afghanistan is seeping into
its borders. In the cases of both India and Pakistan, a collective commitment to the
enforcement of sanctions may have led to a much different outcome in the region today.
Case studies are best suited for this analysis because they allow the researcher to
examine a particular aspect of a historical episode in order to develop and examine
historical explanations that may be generalized to other events, which is why this study is
utilizing case studies. Researchers are able to look far more in depth into the events
being examined than a quantitative study would allow. Case studies are strong where
quantitative methods are weak: there is a high potential for conceptual validity (there is
high validity among a small number of cases rather than lumping together dissimilar
cases), outlier and deviant behavior leads to new hypotheses, there is also a high much
higher capacity for addressing causal relationships, producing much more generalizeable
results. Case studies are structured and focused because there are general questions to be
answered and the researcher only looks at certain aspects of a historical event (George &
Bennett 2004).
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Research Question:
 Why did sanctions achieve a change in behavior occur in South Africa and Libya
and not India and Pakistan?
This study will only attempt to fill in the holes in the literature on collective
sanctions. There are fewer instances of multilateral sanction implementation due to the
fact they have been underutilized. This study will contend that if States collectively band
together in an effort to uphold international law by imposing sanctions upon law-breaking
States conflict areas will be contained and there will be fewer instances of the use of
force. This matters now more than ever because of the situation in Afghanistan. Where
does the international community go if States do not collectively agree to contain the
problem through the use of sanctions? Do policy makers continue the war or do they
attempt to contain the situation? The instability in Afghanistan is poisonous to the entire
region (as seen in Pakistan) and containment through collective sanctions are the best
option for stability and security in the region.
The succeeding chapters will examine each sanctions episode in depth and analyze
the factors that contributed to the success or failure of each. Chapter two will focus on
the sanctions against South Africa. Chapter three will focus on Libya, chapter four will
focus on both India and Pakistan and chapter five will include the conclusions of this
study as well as recommendations for future research. Each case study will provide an
analysis of the various aspects of the sanctions episode. The study will focus on,
collective enforcement, containment, economic hardship, as well as the final outcome of
the sanctions whether that is success or failure. Economic data will provide an indicator
of the economic effects experienced in each target state. Whether or not a regime change
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or a change in policy occurred within each target state will provide evidence of the
success of sanctions.

28

CHAPTER 2
SOUTH AFRICA
This chapter examines the sanctions episode against South Africa and suggest that
sanctions were in fact successful based the regime’s change in behavior. The chapter will
begin by laying out some of the history of the events that took place in South Africa
leading up to the imposition of sanctions. The discussion will then turn to how South
Africa was able to survive sanctions for a period of time and then the discussion will turn
to the various aspects of collective enforcement. Finally, the chapter will provide
economic data that supports the argument that sanctions were successful within South
Africa, helping to end apartheid and the nuclear program.
History of Apartheid in South Africa
Apartheid is the sum of all policies, methods, beliefs and attitudes employed to
guarantee that the white minority dominated the black Africans within South Africa
(Segal 1964). On the 26 May 1948, the white minority in South Africa won a majority of
the seats in Parliament after running on a racist platform. Black Africans in South Africa
were not viewed by the white minority as human beings and years of discrimination
ensued (Nesbitt 2004). Apartheid became the official policy of South Africa in 1948
(Nesbitt 2004).
The government in South Africa was composed of strictly white citizens. The
constitution in South Africa never declared that its citizens were equal. In fact, in 1983 a
new constitution was drafted that co-opted minorities in order to keep blacks from having
political representation (a more complete list of apartheid legislation is provided in table
two) (Hass & O’Sullivan 2005). Only five percent of the blacks and colored citizens in
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South Africa were registered to vote, while 86 percent of the white minority were
registered (Segal 1964). When blacks did try to vote they were forced to pay a poll tax,
discouraging black participation. Between 1946 and 1961 white wages in South Africa
rose 35 percent while black wages rose a mere 11 percent (Segal 1964). During this
period there were 2000 blacks jailed a day for no other reason than the color of their skin.
The government went so far as to bulldoze entire neighborhoods forcing blacks to live in
tenements that are similar to ghettos (Segal 1964).
Table 2
Apartheid Legislation*
Act
Population Register Act, 1950
Group Areas Act, 1950
Separate Representation of Voters Act, 1951
Bantu Authorities Act, 1951

Native Laws Amendment, 1952
Reservation of Separate Amenities Act, 1953
Native Labor Act, 1953
Bantu Education Act, 1953

Effect
Divided the population into racial categories
Complete separation of territory
Colored voters put on separate roll to elect four
white representatives
Tribal authorities only allowed in certain areas.
Blacks in urban areas were considered aliens.
Abolished parliamentary representation.
African born blacks can visit urban areas up to
72 hours with a permit.
Legalized segregation
Blacks can only do certain types of work.
Separate schools, universities, control given to
Ministry of Native Affairs

Note: Information provided in Segal, Ronald. Sanctions against South Africa: International Conference on
Economic Sanctions Against South Africa. London: Penguin Books, 1964.
*Institutionalized apartheid

A major reason that whites favored apartheid was that it kept black labor cheap.
Four out of five black families were starving. The white life expectancy was 62-67 while
the black life expectancy was only 37-42 (Segal 1964). The tax system in South Africa
was also designed to ensure that the black majority stayed repressed. Nonwhites made up
99 percent of the unskilled labor force and 66 percent of the semiskilled labor force,
making the agriculture and mining industries completely reliant on the black labor force
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(Segal 1964). Whites controlled 99 percent of the mining capital, 94 percent of the
industrial capital, 88 percent of the financial capital and 75 percent of the commercial
capital (Segal 1964). It was also illegal for blacks to form labor unions, strike, or
negotiate with employers, leaving the black population reliant on the white minority.
The Path to Sanctions
The campaign for sanctions against South Africa began in 1946 by India over the
treatment of Indians in South Africa. In 1948 the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
(UDHR) was signed, legitimizing claims of mistreatment of the nonwhite ethnic groups
in South Africa and also making apartheid illegal (Nesbitt 2004). In 1952 a group of
African and Asian Member States to the UN wrote to the Secretary General regarding the
discrimination that was then turning violent, taking place in South Africa pleading for
action to be taken against South Africa (Nesbitt 2004).
The May Day Strikes of 1950 resulted in the violent suppression of black
protestors. As a result of this violent suppression, grass roots campaigns in the US and
abroad brought attention to the problems in South Africa (Nesbitt 2004). World leaders
signed petitions and declarations in order to publicly protest the apartheid regime. The
first call for sanctions came in 1959 from the African National Congress (ANC). The
ANC called for a total boycott of South African goods. States including Ghana, Jamaica,
Tunisia, Algeria, Rhodesia, Finland, Sweden, Norway and Sweden quickly lent support
to the movement (Nesbitt 2004).
African nationalism had never been as violent as in the 1960 Sharpeville
Massacre (Rodman 2001; Eyler 2007; Nesbitt 2004). In 1960, South African police
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massacred 64 civilians when the government used force against the blacks and the blacks
used counter-force in order to defend themselves (Segal 1964). The Security Council
condemned the massacre in a resolution in April 1960. The massacre further mobilized
domestic movements against apartheid that gained support from the international
community (Nesbitt 2004). African American civil rights leaders linked their struggle
with the struggle in South Africa, garnering needed support for the anti-apartheid
movement.
As a result of the violence in South Africa, in 1964 the United States imposed
nominal sanctions by restricting EX-IM bank loans availability, military hardware sales,
continued until 1975, and then expanded (Eyler 2007). In July 1964, leaders in the antiapartheid movement, including Nelson Mandela, were sentenced to life in prison. Also in
1964 a sanctions committee in the UN met and determined that South Africa would
indeed be vulnerable to sanctions due to the fact that they imported 38 percent of their
chemicals, 43 percent of its transportation and engineering equipment and 52 percent of
its petroleum products (Nesbitt 2004).
The violence continued and the world was again stunned by a massacre of
unarmed school children that occurred in 1976 (Nesbitt 2004). There was a nonviolent
protest taking place against the imposition of the white language as the main instruction
language in black schools. Policed fired 300 shots into the crowd killing 54 and
wounding 300. Riots then spread throughout South Africa. By the end of this span of
riots, 377 were killed and over 2400 were arrested (Nesbitt 2004). There was yet another
call from the international community to implement stricter sanctions against South
Africa.
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In 1984 there was yet another violent uprising in South Africa that again brought
the anti-apartheid movement back to the attention of the international community. The
Rainbow Coalition, led by the American Reverend Jesse Jackson, was formed and
brought this issue to forefront in the American political stage (Nesbitt 2004). On 21
November 1984, sit-ins took place all over the United States at South African consulates,
coin shops, and federal buildings (Nesbitt 2004).
Also in 1984, South Africa made constitutional changes that opened the
Parliament up to colored and Indian communities but still left the blacks out. As a result
there were increased racial tensions, arrests and disorder within South Africa (Ramphal
1990). Soldiers were brought in to control the riots that were taking place. These events
weakened investor confidence and increased pressure within the international community
for the financial isolation of South Africa’s economy (Ramphal 1990).
Sanctions
There was growing outrage all over the world in response to apartheid. The
solution was to attack the problem on two fronts: (1) make it clear to the world the UN
and its Member States would not tolerate apartheid and (2) the UN would support efforts
to bring change to South Africa (Segal 1964). South Africa was a target for sanctions
because its internal policies of apartheid and nuclear proliferation were a threat to
international peace according to Article 39 of the UN Charter and because South Africa
had a lot of gold which meant that sanctions would cause economic hardship (Segal
1964). In 1962 the General Assembly of the UN recommended that Member States:
break diplomatic relations with South Africa or refrain from reestablishing them; close
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ports to ships flying the South African flag; forbid their ships from entering South
African ports; boycott South African trade; and refuse to land South African cargo
shipments or shipments from any company based out of South Africa (Doxey 1980).
In 1960, the United States and Great Britain supported Security Council sanctions
against South Africa after the Sharpeville Massacre. As a result of this resolution, the
United States placed business restrictions on dual-use technology exports to South Africa
(Rodman 2001). Local governments within the United States began to offer preferential
treatment in bidding for city contracts to firms with no investments in South Africa
(Rodman 2001).
By the end of 1963 the Security Council had twice determined that South Africa
was a threat to peace (Segal 1964). With the repression of the majority of the population
and the denial of self-determination, the situation in South Africa was indeed a threat to
peace (Farrall 2007). The Security Council imposed sanctions and urged the South
African government to end violence against its people and take urgent steps to eliminate
apartheid and racial discrimination. This action taken by the Security Council did little
more than merely condemn South Africa for its policies (Farrall 2007).
Also in 1963, 110 Member States of the UN severed all ties with South Africa
(Segal 1964). Again in 1963, the Security Council imposed an arms embargo against
South Africa, France and Britain abstained from this vote (Doxey 1980). The arms
buildup in South Africa was an extreme consequence of colonialism and demonstrated
South Africa’s defensive posture and willingness to use force if necessary (Segal 1964).
Sanctions needed to be supported by all because South Africa had a very open economy
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with many trading partners. Unfortunately, States figured out ways to circumvent this
arms embargo by conducting illicit arms trades (Doxey 1980). The arms embargo was
imposed because it was the arms trade that the Security Council deemed as the biggest
threat to peace due to the instability that weapons trade could cause in the region (Doxey
1980). That resolution implementing the sanctions differentiated between arms used for
internal suppression and external defense, making it easy for States to avoid adhering to
sanctions, however, the new Labor government in Britain immediately banned all arms
trade with South Africa (Doxey 1980).
South Africa’s invasion of Namibia was also a concern that led to the initial
implementation of sanctions. At the request of the Security Council, the International
Court of Justice declared South Africa’s presence in Namibia illegal (Doxey 1980). In
1973, OPEC imposed a total oil embargo against South Africa. These sanctions were
implemented because South Africa was targeted by the UN to be most vulnerable to these
specific sanctions (Doxey 1980). In 1974 both Great Britain and France vetoed a
Security Resolution that would have expelled South Africa from the UN (Doxey 1980).
In response to the 1983 constitution, bank loans to South Africa stopped and NGOs
pulled out of the region. The United States treaty with South Africa was terminated and
additional sanctions threatened if progress was not made (Hass & O’Sullivan 2000).
Collective Action
There was an international consensus on the issue of the antiapartheid movement
at the ethical level (Doxey 1980). Most States agreed that apartheid was a threat to peace
and needed to be stopped in order to bring stability back to the entire region. By 1986
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most States had imposed sanctions against South Africa (Rodman 2001). The most
damaging source of economic pressure came from the private credit boycott. In order for
this type of capital flight to be successful, States need cooperation from private firms
(Rodman 2001). In 1985, Chase Manhattan chose not to roll over its loans to South
Africa and froze all lines of credit lending, other international banks followed suit
(Rodman 2001).

As a result of the capital flight that occurred and the trade embargoes

that were put place, South Africa was cut off from private capital markets. Due to this
economic hardship, South Africa was unable to achieve political or economic stability
(Rodman 2001).
Grassroots efforts to end apartheid continued in the 1970s and intensified in the
international community due to States’ lack of action towards apartheid (Nesbitt 2004).
During the early 1960s, South Africa lost foreign investment and import markets due to
sanctions. South Africa had a stable economy until the oil prices increased in the 1970s.
From 1964 to 1976 South Africa strengthened its reliance on United States goods and
markets. In 1976, South Africa imported 22 percent of its goods from the United States
and only exported 11 percent to the United States. In 1974, sanctions were strengthened
when South Africa bought uranium and busted Rhodesian sanctions (Eyler 2007).
Sanctions were then furthered strengthened in 1986 as a result of the development of
nuclear weapons in South Africa that was considered a major threat to international peace
and security. The sanctions now banned nuclear collaboration and new United States
investment, prohibiting bank loans and computer sales (Eyler 2007).
There was a ban on all new lending and investment in South Africa (Ramphal
1990). South Africa was treated by the banks as a heavily indebted country which
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restricted the banks’ ability to make new loans (Ramphal 1990). The banks were
encouraged to reschedule payment schedules one year at a time because of the lack of
confidence in South Africa’s ability to repay its debt, due to the economic downturn as a
result of sanctions (Ramphal 1990).
Demonstrating their support for sanctions, the Swiss restricted all lending to
South Africa in 1974 (Ramphal 1990). Banks in the United Kingdom followed suit in
1975. Dutch commercial banks discontinued all lending to South Africa in 1976
(Ramphal 1990). The Danish government terminated export credits, guarantees, and
insurance of exports to South Africa in 1978 (Ramphal 1990). In 1977, some large
United States banks ceased lending to South Africa while local governments within the
United States sold its shares of South African companies (Ramphal 1990). Table 3
displays data on United States’ disinvestment5 in South Africa as an example of how
corporations all over the world got rid of their companies in South Africa.

5

Disinvestment is the withdrawal of foreign companies from their direct or indirect equity investments in
South Africa. The goal of disinvestment is to accelerate the end of apartheid by isolating South Africa and
putting real wealth under threat (Ramphal 1990). Disinvestment reduces the opposition to sanctions. If
businesses have no stake in South Africa then they will not care about the economic impact of sanctions
(Ramphal 1990).
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Table 3
United States Disinvestment in South Africa
Percentage of US Companies
36
23
17
11
6
0.8
0.8
4

Result
Sold to South African companies
Sold to South African management and
employees
Sold to other foreign companies
Closed down
Sold/donated assets to some form of trust
Moved to a neighboring country
Gave assets to a South African church
Disposed of assets in untraceable ways

Note: Information provided in Rodman, Kenneth A. Sanctions Beyond Borders: Multinational
Corporations and US Economic Statecraft. Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2001

Banks’ refusal to lend to South Africa was the most significant sanction in
restricting economic growth. Trade sanctions and disinvestment pressures played a
supporting role in strangling the economy in South Africa (Ramphal 1990). As a result
of disinvestment in the South African economy there was a poor outlook for new
investments. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) would not originate new loans to
South Africa and the international community was comfortable with the idea that
continued sanctions would constrict the economy to the point the government would be
forced to end apartheid (Ramphal 1990).
In 1983, the South African government was targeted with limited financial
sanctions. The incentive for South Africa is the lifting of sanctions (Haass & O’Sullivan
2000). The road map for this action to take place was laid out in the CAAA and listed
five doable actions for South Africa to achieve in order to lift sanctions. In order to lift
sanctions, South Africa needed to: free Nelson Mandela, repeal the state of emergency,
legalize proscribed political parties, repeal two apartheid laws and enter into good faith
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negotiations without preconditions with representative members of the black majority
(Hass & O’Sullivan 2000).
Economic Effects
As a result of sanctions, South Africa could not stop the unemployment rates from
rising. South Africa had to either increase trade or pay back debts because foreign banks
would not make new loans, foreign trade credits provide only a short-term increase in
foreign borrowing, many capital-exporting States banned new investments in South
Africa, and the potential for foreign investors were discouraged by uncertainties as a
result of apartheid (Ramphal 1990). Gold, (South Africa’s main export), faced increased
supplies on the world market as well as uncertain prices and there were limited prospects
to increase non-gold exports from South Africa (Ramphal 1990). South Africa had a
poor economic outlook and the international community agreed that continued economic
pressure would force South Africa to change its policies (Ramphal 1990).
The 1985 financial crisis due to foreign reactions to apartheid grew worse with
the imposition of sanctions. The external debt to GDP ratio rose from 20 percent in 1980
to 46 percent in 1984, more than doubling in only four years (Ramphal 1990). South
Africa’s reliance on short-term private debt rose because it was classified as a problem
debtor that was subject to rescheduling (Ramphal 1990). The Rand (South African
currency) lost a third of its value between 1984 and 1985. The South African economy
went from being classified as a safe economic classification to a high-risk third world
economy (Ramphal 1990). In 1985, there was a withdrawal of voluntary spending which
led to a hike in interest rates and taxes (Ramphal 1990). The exchange rate fell, altered
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savings and investment flows, links to management and technology in the West was
limited, reduced foreign business stake, black job loss was modest (suggesting that
financial sanctions did effect the elites), and use by some disinvestors of franchising
arrangements that may add opportunities for black businessman (Ramphal 1990).
A survey of banks all over the world revealed a lack of confidence in South
Africa’s long-term prospects without government reform (Ramphal 1990). By the end of
1987 MNCs in South Africa declined 40 percent from their peak (Ramphal 1990). With
no rise in the price of gold, the production of gold and exports did not help fill the gap in
the economy. In 1988, South Africa experienced the depreciation of the Rand when the
trade-weighted exchange rate fell ten percent (Ramphal 1990). The President of South
Africa announced plans to privatize many public enterprises and corporations in order to
generate revenue (Ramphal 1990). South Africa’s external debt in 1980 was seven
billion USD and in 1984 it was 24 billion USD illustrating the strain that sanctions put on
the economy (Ramphal 1990). From 1985 to 1992 the GDP in South Africa grew half a
percent each year with 15 percent inflation (Eyler 2007). The strengthening of sanctions
in 1985 is credited with helping to bring an end to apartheid (Eyler 2007).
Conclusion
As a direct result of sanctions, free elections were held in South Africa in 1994
after pressure from the United States domestic movements, international sanctions and
Mandela’s efforts (Nesbitt 2004). In 1994, Nelson Mandela was elected president of
South Africa (Eyler 2007). One reason sanctions in South Africa were successful is
because they restricted South Africa from finding substitute markets. The economy was
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completely isolated thanks to the cooperation of the international community (Eyler
2007). By the 1980s, the international community was turning against South Africa,
leaving fewer States willing to bust sanctions and conduct business transactions with
South Africa (Eyler 2007).
The sanctions episode against South Africa demonstrates that sanctions are a
successful tool of international policy. Sanctions against South Africa were implemented
collectively, leaving the economy completely isolated. When sanctions are applied with
a firm commitment to end a policy, by a collection of States, the probability of success
increases. To this day, South Africa was the world’s only racial autocracy (Kennan
1987). The instability that the policy of apartheid created within South Africa was
undeniable. Fear that the instability would spread to other areas was legitimate given the
invasion of Namibia. In order to avoid using any force the international community
banded together to implement sanctions that isolated the economy to the point the
government was forced to change its policies. While the grassroots efforts that took
place across the world contributed, there is no doubt that sanctions also contributed to
ending apartheid.
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CHAPTER 3
LIBYA
Sanctions were successful in Libya, according to the majority of research on
sanctions6. Some scholars suggest that sanctions against Libya were successful because
they helped to spur secret negotiations that led to the surrender and conviction of multiple
terrorists involved in the Lockerbie and UTA7 bombings and caused Libya to renounce
terrorism as well as its nuclear program (Cortwright & Lopez 2002). The sanctions
against Libya were imposed for numerous reasons, the main area of contention being
Libya’s support for terrorist activities as evidenced by the bombings of Pan Am flight
103 and UTA flight 772 (Haass & O’Sullivan 2000).
Libya fits the model of this research because the sanctions imposed were done so
at first by just the United States, but eventually collectively by the international
community and helped to contain the spread of Libya’s policies. In order to provide an
understanding of how and why sanctions were successful in Libya, this chapter will first
give a brief history of Libya under the autocratic rule of Qaddafi, then turn to the
imposition of the sanctions and provide economic data that supports the claim that
sanctions weakened the economy to the point Libya had no other choice than to begin
secret negotiations with the United States and United Kingdom (Bowen 2006; Rose
1998).

6
7

See references for further reading.
A French airliner.
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History
In 1969 Qaddafi seized power in Libya and immediately sought to impose his will
upon the state (Bowen 2006). Qaddafi declared that Libya was a republic and established
the Revolutionary Command Council. Qaddafi and his colleagues ran the state with an
autocratic rule (Bowen 2006). All the decisions of the state were made by Qaddafi and
his small group of associates. His main priority was always the security and survival of
the regime but in practice Qaddafi’s approach to the external relations of the state was
radical and unpredictable at best (Bowen 2006).
In order to ensure the survival of his autocratic regime, Qaddafi sought to spread
his influence throughout the Arab World by uniting Arab States in a coalition that he
would lead (Bowen 2006). Qaddafi began by creating a welfare state within Libya,
which led to formation of a large public sector that was supported solely by the States’ oil
revenues (Bowen 2006). Qaddafi recognized that public support within Libya was
essential to the survival of the state and thus took the necessary steps to ensure he gained
their favor by creating a welfare State. Qaddafi then continued in his quest for the
unification of the Arab World by supporting various regimes that fought against Israel as
well as helping finance terror and the acquisition of nuclear weapons (Bowen 2006).
Qaddafi was the leader in the Arab World’s fight against Israel, providing
financial assistance to States (Egypt and Syria) that were fighting against Israel as well as
funding the radical Palestinians, one of his first acts in the support of international
terrorism (Bowen 2006). Libya viewed Israel’s nuclear capability and long-range missile
systems as a major threat to the Arab World and thus sought to obtain similar capabilities
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(Bowen 2006). The urgency of this task increased in 1986 when the United States
implemented air strikes against Libya in reaction to Libya’s support for international
terrorism (Bowen 2006). Libya recognized its deficiencies in terms of defense and
sought to obtain capabilities that would deter its enemies. Libya also gave financial
assistance to Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program. Libya gave Pakistan upwards of $500
million USD, hoping Pakistan would in turn share its technology. Libya was promised
that the Pakistani government would share the technology they obtained. Technology
sharing never occurred; Pakistan was able to exploit the Islamic nature of its program in
order to gain funding from Libya (Bowen 2006).
Once the unification of the Arab World failed, Qaddafi’s new goal was to take
down the Arab governments that he deemed to be unacceptable and replace them with
acceptable ones (Bowen 2006). In order to gain the power needed for such a venture,
Qaddafi began the process of gaining chemical and nuclear weapons, otherwise known as
Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs). Ultimately, it was Qaddafi’s desire to spread his
influence and avoid conflict that fueled the desire to obtain chemical and nuclear
weapons (Bowen 2006).
Qaddafi determined that the mere possession of nuclear and chemical weapons
would act as a deterrent for States seeking to use force against Libya. Libya’s inability to
halt aggression from the outside, due to its limited military force, made them want to at
least give the impression that they had nuclear weapons (Bowen 2006). Qaddafi claimed
that nuclear technology was for peaceful purposes, but on several occasions he
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contradicted that notion with his references to an ‘Arab Bomb’8 (Bowen 2006). Qaddafi
used his rhetoric on nuclear weapons as political propaganda, believing that mere words
would deter his enemies (Bowen 2006). Libya approached China, France, India,
Pakistan, and the former Soviet Union in an effort to obtain assistance in gaining nuclear
weapons (Bowen 2006). In 1975, Moscow provided Libya with a nuclear research
reactor (Bowen 2006). Libya’s relations with Moscow allowed them to gain more
sophisticated weaponry which they then supplied to other governments in the developing
world in order to spread their influence, paving the way for Libya’s future relations with
many African States (Bowen 2006).
The Path to Sanctions
Libyan relations with the United States and United Kingdom first began to sour
when Libyan operatives assassinated dissidents living in Europe under the orders of
Qaddafi to kill any “stray dogs” of the revolution in May 1980 (Bowen 2006). In January
1986 airport bombings in both Rome and Vienna were linked to Libya, leading the
United States to impose comprehensive economic sanctions. The United States then
began a campaign to garner international support for sanctions in an effort to isolate
Libya from the international community (Bowen 2006; Eyler 2007).
In June 1981, United States President Ronald Reagan named Libya as the world’s
“most prominent state sponsor of and participant in international terrorism” and sought
international support for a sanctions campaign against Libya (Bowen, 14, 2006).
Initially, the United States’ allies and firms did not support sanctions because: (1) the

8

See Bowen, Wyn Q. “Libya and Nuclear Proliferation: Stepping Back From the Brink.” New York:
Routledge for the International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2006.
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United States told its allies that it would not make concessions with United States and
international firms who were forced to abandon Libya; (2) private firms wanted to
maintain trade and investments with Libya; (3) many European allies were dependent on
Libya for imports (mainly oil) and thought the United States was inflating the problem;
and, (4) five independent oil companies worked with Libya, some operated through
United Kingdom subsidiaries in order to maintain business (Rodman 2001). It was not
until the two bombings of the airliners that the international community took notice of the
threat posed by Libya.
In April 1986, there was another bombing in a West Berlin nightclub for which
Libya was responsible (Bowen 2006). In December 1988, there was yet another bombing
over Lockerbie, Scotland of Pan Am flight 103 that killed 259 people, mostly American
and British nationals (Bowen 2006; Rose 1998). On 19 September 1989 a French airliner
UTA flight 772 exploded over Niger in Africa killing 171 people (Rose 1998).
Investigations into both airline bombings revealed that both were the work of Libyan
intelligence operatives (Rose 1998). In October 1991, a Parisian judge issued warrants
for the arrest of four Libyan intelligence officers. Two weeks later, the United States and
United Kingdom followed suit, issuing warrants for two intelligence officers responsible
for the Lockerbie bombing (Bowen 2006; Rose 1998). Libya also allowed terrorists to
burn the United States Embassy in Tripoli (Bowen 2006). The United States viewed the
fact that Libya did nothing to stop the Embassy attack as blatant support for terrorism.
On the 7 January 1986 the United States banned all trade with Libya and ordered
departure of all United States’ oil companies with investments in Libya (Rodman 2001).
In March 1986, the United States had two events in the Mediterranean involving Libya
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where two Libyan gunboats sank and a missile site was destroyed by United States
warships, but Qaddafi was warned first. The United States received international
criticism for these operations. The United States maintained that it was only taking
retaliatory action and only France lent its support (Eyler 2007).
Sanctions
The United States was the first state to impose the full gamut of sanctions against
Libya (Haass & O’Sullivan 2000). Due to its support for terrorist groups, the United
States sanctioned Libyan arm sales in 1978 and those particular sanctions lasted until
2004 (Eyler 2007). The Reagan administration ushered in an era of heated relations with
Libya and a string of terrorist attacks occurred during this period that were all traced back
to Libya (Bowen 2006). In 1982 the United States embargoed Libyan oil imports to keep
profits from funding terrorist activities (Eyler 2007). A State Department Report in 1986
stated that Libya was “meddling” in Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean, and
South/Southeast Asia, signaling a potential spread of instability (Bowen 2006). The
report was titled “Character of Libyan Policy,” and stated that Libya’s “use of political
economic and military resources in support of anti-Western activities worldwide may be
surpassed only by the Soviet Union, its East European allies, and possibly North Korea
and Cuba” (Bowen, 15, 2006).
On 8 January 1986 the United States froze Libya’s assets in foreign and domestic
American banks (Rodman 2001). The United States imposed comprehensive sanctions
against Libya covering all commercial and financial transactions (Bowen 2006). Libya
struggled as a result of these sanctions, but was still surviving, highlighting the need for
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international cooperation. Sanctions, from the United States perspective, were imposed
against Libya to coerce the government to change its behavior in three specific areas: (1)
a change in attitude towards Israel; (2) renounce support for international terrorist and
extremist movements; and, (3) halt its efforts to obtain WMDs (Hass & O’Sullivan
2000). Sanctions were a way to destabilize the regime by limiting the resources
available to it (Rodman 2001). Aid packages, including monetary aid, country-to-country
student exchanges, telephone links, and lifting restrictions on NGOs were offered as
inducements for compliance with sanctions (Haass & O’Sullivan 2000).
In 1992, the UN imposed full sanctions on air travel and arms sales to Libya in
Security Council resolutions 748 and 883 (Eyler 2007). Security Council resolution 748
demanded Libya extradite two suspects in the bombing of Pan Am flight 103, renounce
terrorism, and assist the French in the UTA bombing investigation (Bowen 2006; Eyler
2007). These sanctions also imposed arms and air embargoes against Libya. Aviation
sanctions were intended to isolate Libya in order to contain its policies and not cause
trouble for others in the region, as well as cause mild economic hardship (Cortwright &
Lopez 2002). These sanctions prevented planes from taking off or landing in Libya,
reduced the diplomatic presence in Libya, there were no insurance pay outs for the
airlines, and no aviation equipment could be bought or sold (Cortwright & Lopez 2002).
Libya violated these sanctions a few times, but was still very isolated from the rest of the
world. Security Council Resolution 883 froze government assets abroad and froze some
oil-transporting equipment (Askari et al. 2003; Cortwright & Lopez 2002). The lack of
oil-transporting equipment would later cripple the Libyan oil industry.
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There were religious exemptions from sanctions placed against Libya; travel bans
were lifted for pilgrimages to Mecca (Cortwright & Lopez 2000). These exemptions
were included in the sanctions package in order to avoid any accusations of human rights
violations on the part of the UN (Cortwright & Lopez 2000). UN sanctions were
designed to be targeted rather than crippling in order to diminish the effect sanctions may
have on bystanders within Libya and abroad (Bowen 2006). The public did however
experience hardship and a decreased standard of living during the sanctions era.
In 1996, the United States named Libya, along with Iran, in a new law that
penalized domestic and international companies for doing business within their borders.
This new law, named the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA), further isolated Libya
economically (Eyler 2007). American and international companies did not stop doing
business in Libya until they were legally required to do so by this law (Rodman 2001).
ILSA called for the imposition of sanctions on any American or foreign company which
made investments that directly contributed to the development of petroleum or natural
gas resources in Iran or Libya. Due to European Union (EU) opposition, the United
States agreed to waive ILSA on the first deal made by companies that violated the act
(Bowen 2006).
Collective Action
The EU was initially resistant to the imposition of sanctions on Libya mostly
because they imported 20 percent of their oil from Libya (Rodman 2001). It was not
until 1988, when Libya was directly tied to the Pan Am bombing of flight 103 that the
EU, as well as the rest of the international community took notice of the threat displayed
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by Libya. This act of terrorism garnered international support for sanctions; however, the
United States was still the main sender (Eyler 2007). As the investigation into the airline
bombing in Scotland uncovered, Libya was home to two of the terrorists responsible.
Because a majority of the victims were American and British nationals, the United States
and United Kingdom were the leaders in the sanctions campaign that would eventually
lead to the prosecution of the terrorists responsible (Bowen 2006; Rose 1998).
In November 1991 the United States, United Kingdom, and France issued a joint
declaration calling for Libya to comply with all their demands. This declaration garnered
the support of the EU and the UN (as evidence of Resolution 731) (Rose 1998). In
January 1992 the UN Security Council Resolution 731 called on Libya to provide a full
and effective response to the British and American investigation, and to a French
investigation into the UTA airliner bombing over Africa. Resolution 731 specifically
called for Libya to surrender the accused persons involved in the two bombings, accept
responsibility for the events, pay compensation, renounce terrorism, and provide details
about the Lockerbie attack (Bowen 2006). Resolution 748 was issued by the Security
Council in March 1992 after Libya ignored the previous resolution. Resolution 748
imposed sanctions on Libya and the sanctions were strengthened in November 1993
when the Security Council drafted Resolution 883 (Bowen 2006).
Secret negotiations took place in the 1990s between the United States, United
Kingdom, and Libya concerning the extradition of the two terror suspects (Bowen 2006;
Rose 1998). Libya wanted to extradite the two suspects in the Pan Am bombing to a
neutral court. Negotiations were at a stalemate until 1998, when negotiating parties
agreed to extradite the suspects to The Hague to face prosecution (Cortwright & Lopez
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2002). Early attempts at negotiations in the 1990s suggest that Qaddafi’s nuclear
aspirations may have begun to change when multilateral UN sanctions were imposed on
Libya in 1992 (Bowen 2006). Qaddafi’s willingness to negotiate may suggest that his
policies and goals for the state were beginning to change. According to some experts,
sanctions may have ended much sooner had the United States and United Kingdom not
been so intent on prosecuting the terror suspects at one of its own courts (Rose 1998).
Economic Effects
Most of the sanctions against Libya were dropped in 2004 because the goals of
the sanctions were met; however, a few did still remain in place. The UN lifted sanctions
in 2004 once Libya turned over the terrorists responsible for the Lockerbie bombing and
spoke out against terrorism which was one of the goals of the sanctions that were
imposed (Eyler 2007). Some argue that success is limited because Qaddafi is still in
power and there is no way of knowing for sure whether or not he still supports terrorists,
but there is no evidence to suggest that there have been any terrorist activities (Eyler
2007). Reports suggest that UN sanctions cost the regime an estimated $27 billion USD
between 1992-1993 and 2001 (Bowen 2006).
In order to fully understand the economic effects that sanctions had on Libya it is
essential to note that in the 1970s and 1980s Qaddafi used profits from the oil boom to
gain and maintain popular support by creating the welfare state (Bowen 2006). Libya
had an ineffective socialist economy and oversized public sector which made it
vulnerable to sanctions in the first place (Bowen 2006). Libya’s economy was
completely reliant on its oil revenues, and without those revenues, the economy would
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suffer. In the 1990s, UN sanctions, coupled with decreasing oil prices caused Libyan oil
exports and revenues to be reduced by half their previous levels (Bowen 2006). ILSA
further constrained the oil sector by limiting production (Bowen 2006). Libyan oil
production in 2003 was half the levels of the 1970s and was unable to expand its
economy because the sanctions limited access to resources (Bowen 2006).
The economic effects sanctions had on Libya included high inflation, high
unemployment, and a decrease in the standard of living. The regime bore the burden of
supporting the population in order to avoid poor humanitarian conditions (Eyler 2007).
Libya claims to have lost $378 million USD due to the sanctions placed upon them
(Cortwright & Lopez 2002). These losses were reported to have been in the agricultural
sectors. Libya reported a $250 million USD loss in crop production, $5 billion USD loss
in livestock production and a ten percent crop loss (Cortwright & Lopez 2002). There
was a 75 percent reduction in government spending. The public sector pay remained
frozen from 1982 to 2003 and 60 percent of government expenditures went to paying
wages as inflation rose (Bowen 2006). Unemployment in 2003 was 25 percent while the
workforce was growing at four percent every 12 months (Bowen 2006). There were
dwindling living conditions in Libya which led to growing dissatisfaction with the regime
(Bowen 2006). Because of the travel sanctions that were imposed, Libyan planes were
turned away from airports all over the world, isolating Libya even further. Europe’s
reliance on Libyan oil made travel bans the easiest to enforce (Rose 1998).
As a result of sanctions, Libya also changed its position on terrorism. The United
States State Department released a report in 2002 that stated there are “no credible reports
of Libyan involvement in terrorism since 1994” and again in 2003 they stated that “close
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official and independent observers of Libyan behavior are hard-pressed to find evidence
of terrorist involvement in the last decade (Bowen 2006).” The changes in Libyan
behavior were directly in line with Security Council Resolution 731 (Bowen 2006).
Libya reached an agreement with the United States and United Kingdom to turn over the
suspects in the Lockerbie bombing. In 1998, through secret negotiations, that were
stalled for years, these three States agreed that the suspects would be prosecuted at The
Hague under Scottish law (Bowen 2006). As a result, Security Council Resolution 1192
was drafted and called for the suspension of all sanctions once the suspects were handed
over in April 1999 (Bowen 2006).
The main goal of sanctions was to get the two Lockerbie suspects extradited to
face prosecution. Once the sanctions were issued in November 1992, they were renewed
every three months. However, in November 1992 the United States, United Kingdom,
and France issued a declaration “pushing to strengthen sanctions unless suspects are
turned over”; there was no change in the situation (Rose 1998). In November 1993,
Security Council Resolution 883 strengthened sanctions against Libya (Rose 1998). The
multilateral embargo was suspended and American, as well as the remaining UN
sanctions stayed in place and the removal depended on continuing cooperation with the
Lockerbie and UTA investigations (Bowen 2006).
Libya also disengaged from the Middle East and garnered allies in Africa who all
opposed continued UN sanctions. In June 1998, the African Union threatened to ignore
sanctions if the Lockerbie issue was not resolved in three months. This was the clincher
in the United States, United Kingdom, and Libya agreeing to prosecute the offenders at
The Hague (Bowen 2006). In 2004, UN sanctions were completely lifted because Libya
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had met all the demands laid out in 1992 by Resolution 731 (Bowen 2006). The United
States also lifted sanctions in 2004.
Conclusion
There have been no reports of terror attacks involving Libya since the imposition
of sanctions, leading many to conclude that sanctions were in fact, successful (Cortwright
& Lopez 2002). Sanctions would have also ended sooner had the United States and
United Kingdom been able to reach an agreement over the neutral court issue in the
Lockerbie case (Cortwright & Lopez 2002). The era of multilateral sanctions led to a
period of change in Libya’s external policies which constitutes a success. Sanctions led
to cooperation and resolution to the Lockerbie issue, the renunciation of terrorism, and
foregoing its nuclear program (Bowen 2006). Sanctions were also successful in
containing Libya’s desire to spread its influence by isolating the entire the state, creating
one less problem State in the Middle East.
On 19 December 2003 Libya announced that it was abandoning its nuclear and
chemical weapons programs and took responsibility for its past actions (Bowen 2006;
Haass & O’Sullivan 2000). Libya was somehow far more technologically advanced in
2003 than was previously suspected. It was assumed that because of sanctions, Libya
was unable to obtain the technology that would have allowed them to produce nuclear or
chemical weapons (Bowen 2006). In December 2003, when Qaddafi opted to halt the
production of a nuclear weapon, it had already obtained all the pieces of the jigsaw to
build the weapon (Bowen 2006). There are four reasons the Libyan nuclear program fell
apart: (1) the program was not well managed; (2) the state experienced brain drain due to
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the sanctions that were imposed; (3) the suppliers were unreliable; and (4) secret
negotiations with United States and United Kingdom had reached fruition (Bowen 2006).
According to the Libyan government the nuclear program ended because it was
no longer in line with Libya’s security interests. In a statement given to the Security
Council in December 2003, Libya claimed “the arms race is conducive neither to its own
security nor that of the region and runs counter to its strong desire for a world blessed
with security and peace (Bowen, 48, 2006).” In a speech given at the March 2004
meeting of the African Union, Qaddafi’s son stated that “the security of Libya does not
come from the nuclear bomb; the nuclear bomb represents a danger to the country which
has [it]. The nuclear arms race is a crazy and destructive policy for economy and life
(Bowen, 48, 2006).” These statements alone suggest that Libya did in fact have a change
in policy which is essential in determining the success of sanctions.
From the British perspective, Libya chose to end its nuclear program because
diplomacy and negotiations prevailed. Libya’s desire to rejoin the international
community was greater than its desire for nuclear weapons (Bowen 2006). From the
American perspective, Libya chose to end its nuclear weapons program because sanctions
were enforced and because the Iraq War sent a strong message (Bowen 2006). The Iraq
War was an interesting anomaly in the sanctions episode. It has been suggested that the
Iraq War was viewed by Libya as an example of what was to come if they did not
cooperate, leading the state to change its policies (Bowen 2006; Rose 1998).
Sanctions worked in Libya because they targeted the States’ dependence on oil to
finance the public sector, were supported by the UN, and discouraged foreign companies
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involvement in the Libyan economy (Bowen 2006). It is interesting to note that sanctions
were not supported by the UN and international community until the Lockerbie incident,
despite Libya’s long history of support for international terrorism. There are five main
reasons why the UN imposed sanctions over the Lockerbie incident: (1) the scale of the
Lockerbie and UTA attacks were dramatically higher than previous incidents involving
Libya; (2) the victims included American, British, and French victims insuring their
cooperation with the United States for UN sanctions; (3) evidence in these cases was
more damning than in the past; (4) Europeans realized sanctions were best way to avoid
the use of force9; and, (5) the end of the Cold War meant that Western States could more
easily utilize the Security Council (Rose 1998). Lesser factors for why the UN imposed
sanctions include the changing Western attitudes towards terrorism and the demise of the
Soviet bloc made action against Libya less controversial within the international
community (Rose 1998).
In practice the entire international community supported sanctions against Libya,
surprisingly even Iran and the Arab World and these sanctions did not have to be
reinforced with a military threat (Rose 1998). The Libyan episode confirms the
ineffectiveness of “slow, publicly signaled, and incremental sanctions (Rose 1998).”
Threats do not work, the imposition of sanctions must be swift and there must be a strong
commitment to enforcement as displayed in the Libyan episode (Rose 1998). Changes in
behavior, along with pressures from American commercial interests eager to do business
in Libya now that UN sanctions were being lifted, provided rationale and motive for
reassessment of policies (Haass & O’Sullivan 2000). The Libyan model provides
9

The EU recognized the United States’ “war eagle” mentality and wanted to avoid any military action,
leading them to support sanctions (Rose 1998).

56

evidence that when sanctions are enforced by a collection of States the possibility for
success is high. The success in Libya is undeniable. Qaddafi’s policies have completely
changed; there has been no spread of terror from Libya, and they have halted their
nuclear program. Do sanctions work? If policy makers follow the Libyan model, then
yes, sanctions work.
Chapter four will discuss why the sanctions episodes against India and Pakistan
were unsuccessful. As briefly mentioned in this chapter, both India and Pakistan have
nuclear weapons and both first tested those nuclear weapons in 1998 (Stern 1998). Both
nuclear weapons programs were illegal by international standards (Haass & O’Sullivan
2000). Sanctions were imposed in both instances; however, they were not imposed in
ways that bring success. The South African and Libyan models of sanctions offer
support for the notion that sanctions are effective. If those models were followed in the
instances of India and Pakistan, the outcomes may have been different. Chapter four will
analyze the histories of both States and their weapons programs. The analyses will then
turn to the sanctions themselves and explore reasons why they were not successful and
finally explore how sanctions could have been successful.
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CHAPTER 4
INDIA AND PAKISTAN
The 1960s were a frightening time in history. The proliferation of nuclear
weapons was a very real fear in the international community, fueled by the realities of
The Cold War (Stern 1999). As a result, The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)
was drafted, signed, and ratified by many States in the international community in the
1960s, and entered into force in 1970 (Stern 1999). India and Pakistan, however, are two
States that refrained from both signing and ratifying the NPT, citing the discriminatory
nature of the treaty, believing there are different rules for States with weapons and States
without weapons (Stern 1999). The end result, as we now know, is that by not signing
the NPT, India and Pakistan were able to develop and test nuclear weapons (Stern 1999).
Since the NPT entered into force in 1970, four States have acquired nuclear weapons:
Israel, India, Pakistan, and North Korea; only India, Pakistan, and North Korea were
subject to sanctions (Hufbauer et al. 2007).
The reasons for each State’s nuclear program are similar and the reactions by the
international community to each nuclear program and subsequent testing also follow
similar paths. Nuclear tests by each State took place in the same month and year and in
reaction to the other so they are grouped together in most discussions on sanctions against
them. This chapter will discuss the actions taken by India and Pakistan in the process of
building their nuclear weapons and the reactions by the international community. This
chapter will analyze the reactions by the international community to the instances of
nuclear testing by India and Pakistan and discuss how, if the international community had
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reacted in unison, the reality of proliferation may be different today. This chapter will
suggest that if the sanctions episodes against India and Pakistan were implemented with
the same commitment to bringing a change in behavior as was the case in South Africa
and Libya, that the international community would have two fewer nuclear powers. This
chapter will frame the situation around both India and Pakistan’s nuclear programs by
analyzing the relationship between India and Pakistan as well as both States’ relationship
with the United States. The discussion will then turn to an analysis of the sanctions
episodes that in turn followed and offer suggestions as to why the sanctions in these two
cases were unsuccessful.
Sibling Rivalry
Overview
There is a long and tumultuous history between India and Pakistan, that can be
best described as sibling rivalry. India and Pakistan have gone to war three times: 1948,
1965, and 1971 (Ahmed 2000). The inception of the Pakistan nuclear program in the
1960s was in response to India’s expansion of its nuclear infrastructure. It was in 1971
that Pakistan officially made the decision to pursue a nuclear weapons program after their
defeat by India in the 1971 war (Ahmed 2000). Tensions between India and Pakistan
rose in the 1980s because Pakistan accused India of supporting insurgents in Sindh and
because of the escalation of Kashmiri militancy that India blamed on Pakistani
intervention (Ahmed 2000). In the 1960s Pakistan wanted to match India’s ability and
prestige and thus began its pursuit of nuclear weapons (Ahmed 2000).

59

In 1965, in response to Pakistan’s rumblings about beginning a nuclear program,
the United States imposed an arms embargo against the State in an effort to curtail its
ability to gain supplies needed to continue with their nuclear program (Ahmed 2000). As
a result of this arms embargo, Pakistan turned to China for its arms supplies, triggering
international suspicion which was already peeked by Pakistan’s refusal to sign the NPT
(Ahmed 2000). In 1974, India conducted its first nuclear test and the United States
pressured both India and Pakistan to end their nuclear programs (Ahmed 2000). In 1980,
the Pakistani policy of ambiguity surrounding the nuclear program was implemented.
Pakistan citied the need for the program as a protection/defense mechanism to counter
India’s program (Ahmed 2000). Pakistani nuclear weapons were meant to balance the
power in the region, creating power parity (Ahmed 2000). In 1990, economic assistance
was halted and an arms embargo on Pakistan was imposed; however, they were limited in
scope and not sustained (Ahmed 2000).
In May 1998, India was the first to test their nuclear weapon. India claimed an
underground nuclear test was over concern for the relationship between Pakistan and
China, as well as Pakistan’s support for terrorism in the Kashmir region (Crow 1998).
Pakistani leaders did not trust India so they responded to Indian nuclear tests with tests of
their own (Ahmed 2000). Pakistan made an extremely calculated decision to retaliate.
Pakistan studied the reaction by the international community to India’s tests, mainly the
P-5 and G-8, and saw how divided they were and chose to test its weapons as well,
assuming international retaliation would be minimal (Ahmed 2000). Pakistan also knew
the international community overlooked both theirs and India’s nuclear programs because
of Pakistan’s standing during the 1980s and India’s strategic location. Pakistan knew
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they would not be treated like Iraq or North Korea (Ahmed 2000). India and Pakistan
posed no security threat to the United States, so many of their activities were overlooked
for decades (Ahmed 2000).
After India and Pakistan tested their respective nuclear weapons in 1998, the
United States considered a restriction on grain exports (Hufbauer et al. 2007). The 1994
Glenn Amendment to the Arms Export Control Act required the president of the United
States to cut off agricultural exports and financial assistance to India and Pakistan,
however, cutting off grain shipments would have hurt the United States’ economy, so
new legislation passed in 1999 that allowed the President to waive the Glenn Amendment
for one year (Hufbauer et al. 2007). India and Pakistan were also both suspected of
producing chemical weapons despite the fact both have ratified the Chemical Weapons
Convention (Stern 1999). The United States’ goal in India and Pakistan was to disrupt a
possible military adventure through sanctions (Hufbauer et al. 2007).
Acting under the Glenn Amendment, the United States automatically imposed
official-level sanctions after India’s detonation of five nuclear weapons in May 1998
(“India and World Peace” 1998). The act itself was a huge setback to the
nonproliferation movement and sanctions were a necessary step to send a strong message
that this action was not acceptable. However, the international community did not follow
suit and the United States was left to go it alone.
India’s uclear Program
In the 1960s, the United States manipulated food and economic aid to India in an
effort to halt India’s nuclear aspirations. This effort failed and India consequently
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conducted nuclear tests in the face of threatened United States sanctions (Hufbauer et al.
2007). In the 1970s, the economic health and political stability of India was strong and
stable, as classified by Hufbauer et al. (2007). The government was in firm control and
the economy experienced the normal range of inflation, unemployment and similar
economic patterns (Hufbauer et al. 2007). India was a British colony and never became a
major power post-colonization. India is classified in the ‘other’ category amongst world
powers because it is also not a least-developed country (Cassese 2005). Internationally,
India tends to align itself with Western States, making itself an ally of the United States
(Cassese 2005). It has been suggested throughout the literature on sanctions against
India, that its alignment with the West is a major reason why there was never a strong
commitment to sanctions on the part of the United States and the rest of the international
community.
India built its nuclear weapons in the Nehru era (Narkilar 2007). Despite its
supposed commitment to disarmament internationally, India conducted a ‘peaceful
nuclear explosion’ in 1974 at Pokhran and again in 1998, referred to as Pokhran II
(Narlikar 2007). In 1978 the United States imposed its first round of sanctions against
India (Status of Sanctions 2001). In 1997, India’s Ministry of Atomic Energy concluded
a deal to build a nuclear station in India (Stern 1999). India then tested its first nuclear
weapon in May 1998 (Stern 1999). India acted after seeing the United States fumble over
Iranian sanctions and its support for China, whom India saw as a major military threat
due to its support for Pakistan (“India and World Peace” 1998). There was minor
international cooperation with the United States imposition of sanctions against Indian,
mainly in the form of symbolic speech and some token restraints (Hufbauer et al. 2007).
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The United States applied sanctions against India around the same time it decided not to
impose sanctions against Iran. The United States terminated all foreign trade except for
food and other agricultural commodities and defense aid, blocked United States’ banks
and federal agencies from offering loans, credit guarantees, or any other financial aid, all
in response to the underground nuclear tests conducted by India in 1998 (Crow 1998).
Pakistan’s uclear Program
Pakistan began developing nuclear weapons in the 1970s. Due to the ambiguity
of the Pakistani nuclear program it was able to withstand international nonproliferation
measures for decades (Ahmed 2000). The United States imposed sanctions on Pakistan
originally because of their relations with China. According to intelligence, Pakistan was
receiving its missile technology from China. Pakistan, of course, called these sanctions
“unwarranted and unjustified (“Pakistan’s Moment”: 1998; France-Presse 2000).” In
1995, Russian physicists reportedly provided consulting services for Pakistan’s missile
and nuclear weapons programs (Stern 1999).
Pakistan was initially angered by India’s nuclear test in May 1998 (“Pakistan’s
Moment” 1998). Pakistan was then further disgusted when sanctions did not follow the
outrage displayed by the international community, with the exception of Japan and the
United States. Pakistan wanted the international community’s actions to match their
words (“Pakistan’s Moment” 1998). After weighing the options, and knowing the
international response would be minimal as it was with India, Pakistan conducted nuclear
tests, displaying what many in the international community viewed as “sibling rivalry
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(“Pakistan’s Moment” 1998).” India welcomed Pakistani tests to deflect attention away
from their test (“Pakistan’s Moment” 1998).
Pakistan had the opportunity to turn the political tides and use India’s bad
behavior to make their own actions look better. Instead, Pakistan reacted negatively and
made themselves look like the bad “little brother (“Pakistan’s Moment” 1998).” The
world opened the door for Pakistan to become another nuclear power by not imposing
collective sanctions against India (“Pakistan’s Moment” 1998). Pakistan saw the way the
international community reacted, or lack thereof, to India’s nuclear tests and knew the
same reactions would be garnered by their own nuclear tests.
Sanctions
The international community felt a great need to restrain India and Pakistan’s
nuclear programs after they each detonated nuclear weapons in May 1998, but were
unwilling to collectively implement sanctions (Ahmed 2000). The nuclear programs
were not new, however, the 1998 nuclear tests proved successful and the international
community now had two new nuclear powers. In 1974, Canada acted to prevent India
and Pakistan from producing nuclear weapons by trying to control the reprocessing of
spent fuel (Hufbauer et al. 2007). This effort proved unsuccessful because both India and
Pakistan were able to gain necessary materials elsewhere. Pakistan had already fallen
under United States sanctions in 1990 under the Pressler Amendment when President H.
W. Bush was unable to confirm that Pakistan did not have a nuclear device (Damrosch
2002). Because of this, the United States imposed an embargo on military sales in
Pakistan over the nuclear issue (France-Presse 2000). Further penalties were imposed in
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1998 in response the Pakistan’s nuclear tests. Japan was the only other State to follow
suit and impose sanctions against Pakistan. Japan froze financial assistance Pakistan
which amounted to $600 million USD annually (France-Presse 2000).
Both India and Pakistan were subject to sanctions under United States law
(Hufbauer et al. 2007). Under United States’ law India was subject to two sets of
sanctions: (1) Glenn Amendment Sanctions because of the testing of their nuclear
weapons; and (2) non-statutory sanctions imposed as a policy tool after the tests were
conducted (Spector 2001). Nuclear cooperation and exports were already restricted by
the IAEA, and had been since 1978 when India began pursuing nuclear capabilities
(Spector 2001). The 1978 sanctions remained in effect, but obviously did not deter India
from gaining nuclear weapons (Spector 2001).
The United States was obligated to impose mandatory sanctions after the 1998
nuclear tests under the 1994 Glenn Amendment (aka Nuclear Proliferation Prevention
Act) which called for the termination of US foreign aid and military exports, the denial of
new financing assistance from United States’ Export-Import Bank, OPIC, TDA, World
Bank, and most other international financial institutions as well has freezing all loans and
credit from the United States’ banks (Spector 2001). Sanctions were implemented with
such flexibility that their potential harshness was never experienced (Spector 2001). In
1998 and 1999 the Brownback Amendments I and II permitted the President to waive
most the Glen Amendment sanctions (Spector 2001). Initially no Presidential waiver was
permitted, however, in 1999, Congress granted the waiver to the President and sanctions
were completed lifted off both States after 9/11 (Hufbauer et al. 2007).

In October

1999, President Clinton took advantage of the Brownback Amendments and waived the
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harshest sanctions against India and some against Pakistan (Spector 2001). Non-statutory
sanctions, meaning diplomatic sanctions, were also eased.
Pakistan was subject to all of the same sanctions as India as well as restrictions on
economic and military aid under the Symington and Pressler Amendments. Pakistan was
also subject to sanctions for importing medium-range missiles from China in the mid1990s and sanctions for the 1999 military coup (Spector 2001). The United States
imposed a two year ban on the imports of certain technologies against the Ministry of
Defense and the Space and Upper Atmosphere Research Commission in India (FrancePresse 2000). Pakistan was subject to harsher sanctions than India, however, because it
imported most of the elements of their nuclear weapons and missiles. The sanctions were
aimed at stopping the illicit transfers. Indian missile and nuclear programs were thought
to be indigenous (Spector 2001).
In 2001 Bush wanted to lift sanctions off India and Pakistan. The United States
wanted nuclear ties with India despite international rules on conducting business with
non-NPT members (“Price of Friendship” 2001). The United States needed better
relations with India to balance China’s power in the region and counter Pakistan’s
nuclear ability (“Price of Friendship” 2001). India and Pakistan knew the United States’
sanctions would not gain international support because they both were strategic players in
States’ foreign policies, including the United States (Schott 1998).
The Security Council condemned the nuclear tests by India and Pakistan through
statements and a resolution. The Security Council did not impose sanctions under Article
VII of the UN Charter, but did “encourage all States to prevent the export of equipment,
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materials or technology that could in any way assist programs in India or Pakistan for
nuclear weapons or for ballistic missiles capable of delivering such weapons, and
welcome (d) national policies adopted and declared in this respect (Damrosch 2002).”
The P-5 members’ leaders declared support for the policy on 4 June 1998 in Geneva, but
did not impose sanctions or take any legitimate action to show this support (Damrosch
2002). The G-8 “planned” sanctions, but never got around to implementing them
(Damrosch 2002). European States put on hold future aid programs in India but did not
withhold any other aid (Kumar 1998).
Effects of Sanctions?
The United States exported electric power to India totaling $300 million USD in
1997 as well as $105 million USD in oil and gas field equipment and supplies (Crow
1998). The United States would not halt this trade and knew that the way it chose to
impose sanctions would only “sting” the Indian economy without the support of the
international community (Crow 1998). Without the expectation of long-term
international support for sanctions, the United States figured it pointless to display a
strong commitment to sanctions that would only fail. The sanctions against India were
more a protest than an actual effort to garner change. In defiance of the sanctions placed
upon them, the Indian government proposed large budget increases in the 1998-1999
fiscal year totaling a 34 percent increase in health care, 50 percent increase in education,
and 91 percent increase in public welfare (Kumar 1998).
The aid-dependent health programs suffered because of the sanctions placed upon
India due to its nuclear tests (Kumar 1998). Overall, sanctions were liberally imposed
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against India and were gradually lifted, having a very small impact (Spector 2001). The
Indian economy grew six percent each year in the period from 1980 to 2002 and eight
percent in the years following sanctions from 2002 to 2006 (Narlikar 2007). India now
has the fourth largest economy in the world which is more evidence that sanctions were
unsuccessful (Narkilar 2007).
One United States official admitted that “the new sanctions will actually have
very limited economic effect, but they do send a strong signal the US oppose these
countries’ missiles programs (France-Presse 2000).” Maximizing armed conflict with
Pakistan at the time of its nuclear testing also made sense because the military in Pakistan
is a key institution; however, another military venture on the part of the United States was
a viable option at that time (Haass et al. 2000). The United States knew that it need not
upset its relationship with Pakistan too much because policy makers knew the value of
that relationship, which proved to be the case post-9/11 (Haass et al. 2000).
Pakistan supported the Taliban and al-Qaeda for five years and then suddenly
decided to support the War on Terror, some suggest was only to persuade the United
States to lift sanctions against them (“Not a Pariah, a Friend” 2002). Pakistan fired key
military officers in an effort to “combat terrorism” domestically (“Not a Pariah, a Friend”
2002). As a reward for its cooperation, sanctions on Pakistan were lifted and banks
rescheduled $13 billion USD in loans and the United States, along with the European
Union, reduced tariffs with Pakistan. The United States provided $600 million USD in
economic poverty alleviation and wrote off more $11 billion USD in debt (“Not a Pariah,
a Friend” 2002). After 9/11, the stock market in Pakistan rose some 45 percent, while
Musharraf’s personal stock rose more drastically (“Not a Pariah, a Friend” 2002).
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Even in the face of Taliban insurgency in Pakistan, President Bush still conceded
the Pakistanis were friends. Pakistan supports the Taliban because that is its defense
against India (Owen 2002). Pakistan reaped the benefits of the United States campaign
against the Taliban, its former “client,” by marginalizing India through its support for the
United States (Owen 2002). The GDP in Pakistan in 2000 was 1.8 percent, down from
4.7 percent in 1998. During sanctions Pakistan experienced a 15.6 percent rise in
inflation in 2000, however, becoming “friends” with the United States only experienced a
2.5 percent increase in inflation in 2001 (Owen 2002).
Post 9/11 Pakistan saw sanctions lifted after the 1998 nuclear tests and 1999
military coup (Owen 2002). Pakistan also saw huge debt relief from the European Union,
Switzerland, and Japan (The Paris Club) that also accelerated reprofiling giving Pakistan
a ten year grace period for repayment of debts (Owen 2002). Foreign Direct Investments
(FDIs) were also expected to increase due to Pakistan’s newfound status in the
international community (Owen 2002). There was also a plan set in place to bring an oil
pipeline to Pakistan (Owen 2002).
The United States ultimately lifted sanctions to gain an ally in the Middle East;
however, polls show Pakistan to be the most anti-American State in the region (Hathaway
2008). Pakistan has quickly become the ‘center of Islamic terrorism (Hathaway 2008).’
Musharaff broke ties with the Taliban in the days following 9/11, leading President Bush
to waive sanctions, forgive debt, reimplement American aid, and more importantly,
reimburse Pakistan for the costs imposed by helping in the War on Terror (Hathaway
2008). There are now more Taliban sympathizers in Pakistan than any other State in the
world (Hathaway 2008). The United States’ relationship with Musharaff legitimized him
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and had no need to restore democracy to Pakistan as long as the United States supported
the regime. This was not the agreement that the two States had; however, the United
States turned a blind eye to the rigged elections that took place (Hathaway 2008).
Bush wanted to drop sanctions because he himself refused to sign the CTBT and
end the United States’ production of nuclear weapons (“Price of Friendship” 2001). The
United States defied international law as well in this manner. Bush promoted India and
Pakistan learning to live peacefully with their bombs (“Price of Friendship” 2001). On
the 22 September 2001, President George W. Bush of the United States lifted sanctions
on both India and Pakistan (International Law Update 2001).
Conclusion
In the case of India and Pakistan no efforts were ever made for confidence
building measures between the United States, India and Pakistan. There is still a race to
see who can build the longest range missile (India or Pakistan) and the United States only
created more turmoil between the States by dropping the issue (“Price of Friendship”
2001). Both States now deem it acceptable to pursue such avenues because they never
suffered severe enough consequences for their original misbehavior.
Sanctions did not deter India or Pakistan from building nuclear bombs. No doubt
sanctions lengthened the process, but government leaders made acquiring weapons their
state’s main goal, making the coercive effect of sanctions ineffective (Hufbauer et al.
2007). Regime change was not the goal of either sanctions episode in India or Pakistan
(Hufbauer et al. 2007).
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The United States hoped, that the sanctions it did impose would “cause major US
companies and financial institutions to rethink entirely their presence and operations in
India (Crow 1998).” As we well know, this did not happen. The United States never
imposed consequences upon companies and financial institutions that chose not to
support sanctions, leading them to conduct and start new business within India all
throughout the sanctions episode (Crow 1998). It can also be offered that sanctions did
not work because Clinton wilted at India’s refusal to roll-back its nuclear program and
sign the Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) (“Price of Friendship” 2001).
The fact remains that “it is easier to start a nuclear chain reaction than to stop one
once is has started (“Pakistan’s Moment” 1998).” If the United States had the support of
the international community when India and Pakistan first began developing their nuclear
programs, or at least once the tests were performed, there would be two fewer nuclear
powers. It also would have helped to deter Pakistan if the punishments to India were
matched by aid to Pakistan (“Pakistan’s Moment” 1998). The European Union thought
further isolation of Pakistan would only worsen the problem (France-Presse 2000).
America and Japan were expected to impose the same sanctions against Pakistan as India
if they also tested nuclear weapons. Sanctions were expected to Pakistan harder because
they were more in debt. India could afford to ignore sanctions while Pakistan could not
(“Pakistan’s Moment” 1998). If the international community, especially Britain, had
applied sanctions, Pakistan would have felt more secure. The more India suffered
economically, the more reassured Pakistan would have been (“Pakistan’s Moment”
1998).
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In the nuclear proliferation cases in India and Pakistan, the denial of key hardware
was an integral part of the sanctions package, but since sanctioned components were sold
to them by other States offering alternative supplies, the goal of nonproliferation in both
India and Pakistan proved to be unachievable (Hufbauer et al. 2007). The ability of both
States to find alternative avenues for obtaining weapons components highlights the need
for collective sanctions. Western powers were able to prevent South Korea, Taiwan,
Brazil, Libya, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan from obtaining nuclear weapons because they
were denied key ingredients needed in producing such a weapon and had the cooperation
of the international community (Hufbauer et al. 2007). These multilateral efforts were
successful in most of the cases; however, no such efforts were made to prevent India and
Pakistan from producing and testing a nuclear weapon (Hufbauer et al. 2007).
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CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSION
It is true that sanctions, in and of themselves, when implemented by a lone state,
are usually unsuccessful as displayed in the case studies of India and Pakistan. The
literature on sanctions has cited this fact, time and time again. It is also true, that in the
instances when sanctions have been successful, they have been implemented by a
collection of States, contained the spread of instability, and changed the behavior of the
regime in power or served as a catalyst for regime change, as displayed by the case
studies on South Africa and Libya. The purpose in this study is not to suggest that
sanctions are the only reason that apartheid ended in South Africa and that Libya
renounced its support for terrorism, but to suggest that sanctions were a valuable and
strong tool in the arsenals of the States that imposed them against those two regimes. In
both South Africa and Libya, sanctions were a mitigating factor in the eventual change in
behavior experienced in both States. War was avoided and this, by the standards of this
study, is one reason to decree success on the part of the sending States. Sanctions against
South Africa and Libya may have lasted decades, but an eventual change in behavior
occurred. States are run by human beings, and human behavior does not change
overnight.
If sanctions can be implemented, war or some other use of force can be avoided,
and a change in behavior or some concession that is deemed reasonable is made, then it
seems logical to conclude that sanctions do indeed work and should be utilized in an
achievable manner. There are guidelines for implementing sanctions that are apparent
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after studying the cases of success in South Africa and Libya. First, as contended
throughout this study, sanctions need to be implemented by a collection of States. As
was displayed in the cases of India and Pakistan, no one State can go it alone. Sanctions
imposed by a single (or a few) States leave room for the target to find alternatives to
sanctioned goods and services (Haass et al. 2000; Askari et al. 2003). If the major
powers do not collectively impose sanctions, there is no hope for success because the
economies in the target States will not suffer. There needs to be little room for the target
to find alternatives in for order the economy to dwindle enough to cause a change in
behavior.
Collective sanctions also send a stronger message and as a result of multiple
States participating, there is much stronger enforcement (Clark 1932). When sanctions
have the support of multiple States, the targets have no place to appeal the sanctions
because there is no strong authority that is not a participant in the implementation of the
sanctions (Doxey 1999). This is especially true when sanctions are implemented by
superpowers, as well as when regional blocs have the cooperation of superpowers (Doxey
1999). It is a rare instance when one State can alone significantly affect the economy of
the target State (Askari et al. 2003).
States also need to be willing to commit to sanctions over the long-run. Sanctions
do not work overnight, as evidenced by episodes of successful sanctions in this study.
Although, some experts cite this as a reason why sanctions are unsuccessful, this is still a
cheaper alternative than war, and lives are spared (Cortwright & Lopez 2002). States
must weigh the costs and benefits of imposing sanctions. Yes, they may take years,
decades even, but there is light at the end of the tunnel. The objectives of the sending
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States can in fact be achieved with patience and strong commitment. The unfortunate
truth is war is extremely costly. The current Iraq War is an example of such an instance.
The sanctions against Iraq after the first Gulf War were working. Saddam Hussein was
contained, not supporting terrorists, and not using chemical weapons on neighboring
States. However, since the start of the war in 2003, there has been increased instability in
the region, billions of dollars spent to the detriment of the United States budget, and
thousands of soldiers and civilians killed.
Finally, sanctions need to be implemented swiftly (DeSouza 2000). The more
time that lapses between the actual transgression of the target and when sanctions are
actually imposed, the less effective financial sanctions will be (DeSouza 2000). When
sanctions are implemented swiftly, States’ leaders have less time to hide their assets,
giving sanctions more of an opportunity to economically affect the elites in the target
State (Hass et al. 2000). The goal of sanctions should first be to hit the wallets of those in
charge in an effort to increase the likelihood of success. It makes sense that if the leaders
of a State are suffering economically, the more likely they will be to concede to the
demands being made the sending States, or at least begin the negotiation process.
The logical conclusion now becomes that the creation of a G-20 sanctions group
needs to be considered in order to avoid future uses of force and unsolved conflict. This
group would meet annually at the G-20 summit and develop a coordinated plan of action
for potential trouble spots in the world. This consultation would ensure that a joint effort
is possible and swift when States break international law. Knowing that the G-20 has a
resolute plan of action in place for instances of law-breaking could also potentially act as
a deterrent for States that are considering breaking the law. The ability of the G-20 to
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present a unified force has the potential to be a strong security policy in the international
community. Also, once smaller States recognize the G-20’s commitment to sanctions,
they too may have more incentive to join in the implementation of sanctions. “A disease
which can be cured in its early stages must not be allowed to continue its ravages until
the limb is mortified before treatment has begun,” instances of international law –
breaking needs immediate attention and sanctions should be one of the first steps taken
by the major powers to deal with the problem (Royal Institute 1938).
When an instance of international law-breaking occurs, citizens look their
governments for solutions. Iran is an instance of this reaction. People want something to
be done! “The imposition of sanctions absorbs the initial public reaction that something
needs to be done (Drezner 1999).” By imposing sanctions, States send the public a
message that they are handling the situation. The public wants reasonable action to be
taken, and sanctions are that acceptable avenue of punishment. Enforcing the law is a
critical principle in every organized society, both internationally and domestically; the
enforcement of this critical principle the responsibility of the State in order to maintain
law and order (Clark 1932). Sanctions are, as pointed out be former UN SecretaryGeneral Kofi Annan, a “necessary middle ground between war and words (Farrall
2007).”
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